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Italy
The debate over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
after 2020 is mainly focused on making more effective 
the public expenditure on agriculture. Specific attention 
is given to the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) of Pillar I, 
which is criticized for being unequally distributed and 
scarcely targeted towards specific and measurable goals. 
The present paper is aimed to evaluate whether and how 
the choice of land as a criterion for redistributing and re-
ceiving aids affects the ability of the BPS to enhance farm 
incomes. To this end, the Italian version of the Farm Ac-
countancy Data Network is used. Findings reveal that 
other parameters, such as work and value added, should 
be also taken into account in order to improve the effec-
tiveness of BPS in increasing incomes of Italian farms.
1. Introduction1
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a complex and multi-objective 
policy that addresses several sectoral and territorial challenges related to agri-
cultural and rural areas. Due to its specific nature, it is particularly difficult to 
clearly evaluate whether and in which measure specific goals are achieved, as 
well as how effectively public resources are used. 
CAP subsidies were promoted based on concerns for the chronically low 
and highly variable incomes of farmers. Innovations in terms of farm income 
support tools included the introduction of direct payments with the MacShar-
ry Reform in 1992. These direct payments have represented one of the most 
important tools of the CAP, aiming to finally overcome the main shortcom-
ings of the CMOs during the 1960-1990 period, as well as to strengthen the 
EU’s position in WTO agricultural trade negotiations (Ciliberti and Frascarel-
li, 2015). However, it was only thanks to the Fischler Reform of 2003 that this 
1 The authors acknowledge the Council for Agricultural Research and Agricultural Econo-
mics Analysis (CREA) for providing access to the Italian version of Farm Accountancy 
Data Network database. 
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tool finally gained acceptability in the eyes of international competitors. In-
deed, this reform movement went beyond the distortions of productions and 
market equilibria caused by coupled direct payments, introducing a new sys-
tem of decoupled aids, called the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) (Gohin, 2006). 
Since 2005, the SPS has represented one of the milestones of the CAP as a 
whole, absorbing about two-thirds of its budget (Henke and Coronas, 2011). 
The introduction of the SPS has removed the link between production and 
subsidies and has increased farmers’ freedom to produce in response to mar-
ket demands. The SPS worked thanks to a system of payment entitlements 
that only went to farmers actively farming (Erjavec et al., 2011). Decoupled 
payments were granted, where farmers have eligible hectares at their disposal 
to activate the appropriate number of entitlements. 
The 2013 CAP reform has introduced a new scheme with seven compo-
nents of direct payments, with the aim of improving both the tailoring and 
targeting of direct payments (Ciliberti and Frascarelli, 2015). Moreover, for 
the first time, the current programming period (2014-2020) offers a Common 
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) to measure the performance 
of the whole CAP (both Pillars I and II). In more detail, concerning Pillar I, 
Figure 1 shows that each component of direct payment responds to one or 
more of those specific objectives (European Commission, 2015). 
What emerges from the “Technical handbook on the monitoring and 
evaluation framework of the common agricultural policy 2014 – 2020” is that 
there are four payments that mainly aim to enhance farm incomes (basic pay-
ment scheme, redistributive payment, small farmers scheme and voluntary 
coupled support), one payment with provision of environmental public goods 
as a priority (greening); one payment that contributes to improving agricul-
tural competitiveness (payment for young farmers) and, finally, one payment 
whose purpose is the maintenance of agricultural diversity in order to foster a 
balanced territorial development (payments for areas with natural constraints). 
In financial terms, such an intervention logic implies that payments aim-
ing to enhance farm incomes absorb approximately 70% of resources for the 
EU-28; therefore, it clearly represents a strategic objective of Pillar I for the 
2015-2020 period. In more details, specific attention must be paid to the basic 
payment scheme (BPS), as it requires more than 50% of resources available for 
direct payments in the EU (that is, €161.27 billion for the 2015-2020 period). 
It is nothing more than a scaled-down version of what was the SPS in the pre-
2015 CAP. Furthermore, the BPS is operated based on payment entitlements 
allocated to farmers in the first year of application of the scheme and then ac-
tivated each subsequent year by farmers.
The present paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the CAP 
by proposing a quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of direct payments 
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in Italy, using data from the Italian version of the Farm Accountancy Data Net-
work (FADN). Particular attention is paid to verify whether and how the BPS is 
able to enhance farm incomes. Research questions to be addressed are twofold:
- Is the application of the BPS in Italy able to effectively enhance farm in-
comes?
- Is it possible to introduce changes in order to improve the ability of the 
BPS to enhance farm incomes? If yes, what are possible solutions?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports on the main literature 
on direct payments, shedding light on the main limitations and shortfalls that 
have attracted the attentions of several scholars in the last decade. Section 3 
describes the methodology and data adopted in order to verify our research 
hypotheses. Section 4 shows the main results we obtained, and Section 5 con-
tains a discussion on existing literature. Finally, conclusions are illustrated, 
and suggestions for both policymakers and stakeholders are presented.
2. Policy and theoretical framework
The 2013 reform has replaced the SPS with the BPS, which mainly aims 
to enhance farm incomes. It operates on the basis of payment entitlements al-
Fig. 1. Intervention logic for direct payments.
Source: European Commission (2015).
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located to farmers in the first year of application of the scheme and then ac-
tivated each subsequent year by farmers. Entitlements are activated annually 
by matching them with a corresponding number of eligible hectares. What 
clearly emerges, therefore, is that a strong link between entitlements, payments 
and land is still at stake. Scholars have increasingly paid attention to this issue. 
Evidence highlights that since land availability is a precondition for obtaining 
aid, there are collateral effects that negatively impact the effectiveness of pub-
lic support for farmers’ income, including i) high (and unequal) concentration 
of direct payments and ii) capitalization of this aid on land prices. 
Henceforth, a literature review concerning these two issues is proposed.
2.1 Distribution of direct payments
With regard to concentration of direct payments, it must be noted that even 
though the European Commission defends direct payments as a basic income 
support for farmers, serious concerns have been expressed regarding the ineq-
uitable distribution of strongly concentrated direct payments (Allanson, 2006).
There is unanimous agreement on what makes direct payments so highly 
concentrated and unequally distributed at the farm level. It is the nature of the 
support, which is largely area-based, that is the main determinant of such an 
unequal concentration (Severini and Tantari, 2015b). Indeed, distribution of 
direct payments is clearly driven by the concentration of land, such that the 
former is as concentrated as the latter: 20% of the largest farms in the EU con-
stitute 80% of agricultural land and production. Such an impact is confirmed 
by official statistics that highlight how 80% of direct payments are approxi-
mately granted to 20% of the biggest beneficiaries in terms of direct payment 
amounts (European Commission, 2017). There are two types of member states 
according to direct payment distribution in the EU: those with a low concen-
tration of direct aids (Finland, Netherlands, France) and those with a high 
concentration of direct aids (Portugal, Italy, Spain). Von Witze and Noleppa 
(2007) showed that the main beneficiaries of such payments are farms with 
large cultivated areas, instead of small or medium farms. Moreover, the dis-
tribution of direct aid is largely unequal, because high-income farms take a 
large share of the payments (Allanson and Rocchi 2008; Mishra et al. 2009). 
In addition to the concentration issue, scholars have also shed light on the 
role played by CAP in affecting farm income distribution. Several studies 
have shown that direct payments cause income inequality to decrease (Keeney, 
2000; Severini and Tantari 2013a; 2013b; 2015a), whereas other analyses have 
concluded that these aid payments increase income concentration (El Benni 
and Finger, 2012). 
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Schmid et al. (2006) claimed that in most cases, direct payments do not pre-
vent a relevant share of European farmers from remaining in the poorest decile 
of farm income. In this regard, one of the objectives of the 2015-2020 CAP Re-
form was to improve the distribution of direct income support among farmers 
by redesigning first pillar payments (Hansen and Offermann, 2016). However, 
analysing direct payments given in the year 2015 reveals that just 5% of direct 
payments went to farms with incomes below the median, while 95% of payments 
went to farms with incomes above the median (Matthews, 2016). The same au-
thor (2017) states that in the debate about the future of direct payments, such a 
skewed distribution of direct payments, with the main beneficiaries being farms 
with relatively high incomes, could strongly undermine their justifications. 
2.2 Capitalization effect
Depending on both farm size and the duration of the tenant-landlord 
agreement, decoupled direct payments linked to land positively influence land 
rents because only those who own or have rented eligible land can claim pub-
lic support (Killian and Salhofer, 2008; Kirwan and Roberts, 2015). Because 
eligibility for direct payments depends on control over land, these types of aid 
are capitalised into land value (Gohin, 2006; Matthews, 2017). It entails that 
payments are transferred in land rents, so that support to actual farmers de-
pends on the share of land they own. Therefore, it is a quite straightforward 
relationship that the greater the share that goes to land and landowners, the 
less effective direct payments are as a means of supporting farmers’ income. 
What emerges is a highly distributive leakage of the benefits of direct pay-
ments to non-farm groups that may reduce transfer efficiencies of direct pay-
ments. Attempts to quantitatively estimate the so-called “capitalization effect” 
revealed that it varies from 0.20 to 0.90 for each unit of subsidy given to farm-
ers (Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Breustedt and Habermann, 2011; Hendricks et 
al., 2012; Kilian et al., 2012; Klaiber et al., 2017; Kirwan, 2009; Patton et al., 
2008). Recent evidence confirms that the 2013 CAP Reform caused land rental 
prices to increase relative to the pre-reform situation. On average, 27% of de-
coupled payments are channelled to non-farming landowners in the EU after 
the 2013 CAP reform. It follows that around €10.2 billion per year is expected 
to be channelled outside the farming sector in the EU in the 2014-2020 period. 
Such a leakage effect that benefits non-farming landowners implies further in-
come inequalities among farmers in the EU (Ciaian et al., 2017). Moreover, as 
EU member states move towards harmonised payments, the capitalization of 
direct payments is expected to increase if it is not accompanied with measures 
that have an opposite effect.
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The capitalization effect clearly reduces the effectiveness of direct pay-
ments. It results in increasing the price of land and, as a consequence, in in-
hibiting the conversion of agricultural land to other uses, as well as inhibit-
ing the entrance of young farmers into the agricultural sector, due to the in-
creased capital outlays required to purchase a farm (Patton et al., 2008). All in 
all, such an effect inhibits, or at least hinders, income support to farmers, one 
of the main goals of direct payments (Latruffe and Le Mouel, 2009).
Against this backdrop, what clearly emerges is that direct payments suf-
fer from some relevant distortions that negatively affect their ability to sustain 
farm incomes. Unequal concentration on the one hand, and distributive leak-
ages on the other hand, hinder the achievement of one of the main objectives 
of direct payments, that is, enhancing farm income. As a consequence, they 
have been criticized by both stakeholders and influent think-tanks that pro-
pose to overcome such an efficient system of public aid contractually support-
ing farmers (Buckwell et al., 2017). Other scholars suggest that in light of these 
challenges, future CAP reforms should aim at designing a decoupled payment 
scheme in a way that is not the owners of agricultural assets, e.g., land, but 
farmers who benefit from CAP subsidies (Ciaian et al., 2017). 
Notwithstanding, the European Commission (2017) still defends direct 
payments as a valuable tool, since they represent approximately 40% of EU 
farm income. However, it recognizes that improvements are needed in order 
to increase direct payment reliability. Therefore, since CAP accountability is 
under discussion and since there is a high level of scepticism around such a 
policy, an evidence-based approach is a valid solution to increase direct pay-
ments’ effectiveness.
In this regard, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, apart from focusing 
attention on different adverse effects of the linkage between direct payments 
and land, analyses of possible solutions to increase direct payment ability to 
enhance farm incomes have not yet been provided. Therefore, with reference 
to the Italian case, the present paper aims to test the following hypotheses: 
- H1. Land is not an effective parameter to enhance farm incomes via BPS. 
- H2. There are other parameters that can enhance farm incomes and re-
duce collateral effects currently at stake because direct payments are linked 
to land.
3. Material and methods
The exploratory nature of the present paper explains the choice to opt for 
mixed methods to analyse different aspects affecting the ability of direct pay-
ments to enhance farm incomes. The role of land in influencing the alloca-
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tion and distribution of direct payments is indeed clear. The step beyond is to 
analyse whether there are other parameters that more effectively sustain farm 
incomes. In this regard, since Annexes 2 of the Uruguay round agreement on 
agriculture (URAA) has established that in order qualify green box subsidies 
“the eligibility for decoupled income support shall be determined by clearly-
defined criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use 
or production level in a defined and fixed base period” tested solutions are 
work (measured as work unit, WU) and value-added (VA, as a proxy of in-
come), as well as ratios obtained by combining them, such as work/land (WU/
UAA), value-added/work (VA/WU) and value-added/land (VA/UAA). 
For this purpose an original evaluation is proposed, with explicit reference 
to the BPS. It is referred to Italy, where BPS absorbs about 60% of direct pay-
ment budget (that is about €13.0 billion for the 2015-2020 period) and there-
fore represents the main component of the new direct payment scheme that is 
established in order to enhance farm incomes in Italy (Ciliberti and Frascarel-
li, 2015). More specifically, three well-known methods are used in order to 
analyse whether there are parameters alternative to land (measured as utilized 
agricultural area, UAA) that may be used for allocating direct payments to 
more efficiently enhance farm incomes. 
For the first step of the evaluation, a correlation analysis is adopted in or-
der to i) estimate the strength of the relationships between farm incomes and 
the BPS, and ii) compare the Pearson’s coefficients according to different pa-
rameters are used to allocate the BPS to establish a ranking based on ability to 
effectively enhance farm incomes. 
The second step concerns the decile analysis. By grouping farms into 10% 
categories according to farm income levels, the distribution of the BPS accord-
ing to income deciles when different parameters of allocation (land, work, 
value-added) is measured and evaluated. Again, for each parameter adopted, 
the inter-decile ratios (better known as the P90/P10 ratio that compares the 
amount of BPS received in the highest income decile to that in the lowest) are 
calculated to compare and rank the solutions proposed on the basis of ability 
to effectively and equally sustain farm incomes.
Last, but not least, the Gini coefficient is applied. It is the most commonly 
used measure of inequality and is used in the present paper to highlight BPS 
concentration, when different parameters for allocation of such public aid are 
used. Even in this case, a ranking of the solutions adopted is proposed based on 
the ability to equally redistribute the BPS to effectively sustain farm incomes.
Finally, the results obtained by each analysis are summarized in order to 
allow a final comparison, with the aim to globally rank parameters used for 
the allocation of direct payments on the basis of their ability to combine both 
effectiveness and equity in enhancing farm incomes.
178 S. Ciliberti, A. Frascarelli
As already specified, the abovementioned analyses concern Italy. They are 
carried out using the Italian version of the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
– better known as Rete Italiana Contabile Agraria (RICA) – provided by the 
Council for Agricultural Research and Analysis (CREA). The FADN is a com-
monly used dataset for the economic assessment of the CAP, since it is the 
only source of harmonized micro-economic data that is representative of com-
mercial agricultural holdings in the EU (European Commission, 2010).
The dataset adopted for the quantitative analysis is from 2015, the first 
year of application of the new direct payment scheme for the 2015-2020 pe-
riod. The FADN dataset allows for the isolation of the main component of 
direct payments that is directly aimed at enhancing farm income (e.g., BPS) 
as well as to investigate structural and economic characteristics, such as cul-
tivated land (utilized agricultural areas), employment (work units) and per-
formance (farm income, valued added). Here, it is assumed that the latter are 
continuous variables that could be alternatively used as parameters for the 
allocation of direct payments in order to compare their effectiveness in sus-
taining farm incomes. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used with reference to the Italian version of the FADN for 2015.
Moreover, it must be noted that the quantitative analyses refer to the en-
tire population of Italian farms thanks to the application of individual weights 
provided by the FADN. Such a choice allows for the extension of the results in 
order to provide meaningful implications for policymakers. 
4. Main findings 
This section reports the main results obtained by analysing the impact of 
alternative parameters used for allocation of the BSP in Italy.
To reallocate the budget for the BPS (that is, in the weighted sample, ap-
proximately 1.46 million euros) among farms of the RICA dataset, first, all av-
erage national values (ANV) for each parameter are calculated (Tab. 2). 
Subsequently, these reference values are used for distributing the basic pay-
ment on the basis of each parameter. In practice, the BPS is allocated by multi-
plying the ANV for the value of each parameter at the farm level. The applica-
tion of such a procedure caused different distributions of payments at the farm 
level, with specific impacts on the redistributive efficacy of the BPS.
To evaluate these effects, first, the correlation between farm income and the 
BPS is measured for every parameter used to allocate this public aid. Figure 2 
shows the distributions of the BPS according to the different parameters used. 
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Source: our elaboration on Rica dataset, 2017.
Fig. 2. Correlations between FI and BPS with different parameters of allocation (UAA, WU, 
VA, WU/UAA, VA/WU, VA/UAA).
Source: Our elaboration on RICA dataset, 2017.
What clearly emerges is that there are some relevant differences in the cor-
relations between BPS and farm income levels in the simulated scenarios. This 
is a first indication that parameters matter in affecting the distributions of the 
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BPS, so if the aim is to enhance farm income, a parameter with specific char-
acteristics should be identified. More in detail, an effective parameter should 
be weakly correlated with farm income, meaning that the distribution of pub-
lic support does not provide advantage to the farms with the highest level of 
income but, conversely, tends to progressively redistribute across farms on the 
basis of pre-support income level. 
Table 3 compares the effects due to the use of alternative parameters for 
the allocation of direct payment, by ranking values of the coefficient/ratios in 
decreasing order. 
It reveals that when VA is used as a parameter, the distribution of the BPS 
is strongly correlated with farm income level (ρVA=0.96 and ρVA/WU=0.63). This 
is because VA is a component of farm income. WU and UAA show correlation 
effects of medium intensity (ρWU=0.47 and ρUAA=0.45), implying moderate re-
lationships with the distribution of farm incomes. Conversely, the VA/UAA 
and especially the WU/UAA ratios show low and very low correlations, re-
spectively, with farm income levels in Italy (ρVA/UAA=0.20 and ρUAA=0.03). Such 
a finding suggests that by using WU/UAA as a parameter for allocating the 
BPS, public aid is distributed without specific benefit for farms with the high-
est level of income. It is therefore straightforwardly concluded that parameters 
that are inversely correlated with land (like UAA) allow a more equal distribu-
tion of the BPS, since income support is scarcely correlated with pre-support 
income levels. 
Table 3 also highlights how different parameters adopted in the simulation 
affected the distribution of BPS in terms of concentrations in the lowest/high-
est deciles of farm income. Such an analysis is particularly useful to evaluate 
the contribution of each parameter to equity. As for inter-decile ratio, find-
ings clearly show that when VA is used, the distribution of income support 
Tab. 3. Ranking of alternative parameters for allocation of direct payments based on Pear-
son’s r, P90/P10 and Gini coefficient.
Pearson’s r p90/p10 Gini coefficient
VA 0.96 VA 25.35 UAA 0.72
VA/WU 0.63 VA/WU 9.56 VA 0.67
WU 0.47 UAA 8.95 VA/UAA 0.66
UAA 0.45 WU 3.42 WU/UAA 0.56
VA/UAA 0.20 WU/UAA 0.97 VA/WU 0.46
WU/UAA 0.03 VA/UAA 0.49 WU 0.41
Source: our elaboration on Rica dataset, 2017.
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is totally unequal because public support for farms in the uppermost decile 
of income is about 25 or 9.5 times higher than those for farms in the lowest 
decile. Similar results occur when UAA is adopted (p90/p10=8.95), confirm-
ing that cultivated land is not able to ensure a fair and equal distribution of 
the BPS. Different results are obtained when WU is introduced, since it al-
lows a more equal redistribution of farm incomes, especially when combined 
with UAA (p90/p10=0.97). In such a case, farms in the lowest decile of income 
would benefit from the same amount of BPS as those in the uppermost decile. 
However, the parameter causing a more equal (and progressive) distribution 
of farm income is VA/UAA (p90/p10=0.49), since it allows farms in the lowest 
decile of income to double public resources received compared to farms in the 
uppermost decile.
Lastly, the analysis of the Gini coefficient (Tab. 3) confirms that UAA and 
VA (GUAA=0.72, GVA=0.67 and GVA/UAA=0.67) produce a strong concentration 
of the BPS in the higher decile of farm income (due to strong correlation of 
these parameters with farm income level). Again, WU allows reduced concen-
tration of public support, but with some relevant differences in terms of both 
effectiveness and equity. Indeed, whereas VA/WU and WU are scarcely con-
centrated (GVA/WU=0.46 and GWU=0.41) but strongly correlated with farm in-
come, WU/UAA (GWU/UAA=0.56) is a parameter that fits with both prerequi-
sites useful to ensuring effective and equal support to farm income: it is slight-
ly concentrated, but at the same time, scarcely correlated with farm income. 
As a result, this latter parameter combines better than others both the prereq-
uisites needed to ensure more effective and equal distribution of BPS in Italy.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The analysis based on the Italian FADN dataset can contribute to the de-
bate over direct payment, since it demonstrates that the choice of land as a pa-
rameter for both distribution and assignment of the BPS is pivotal in negative-
ly affecting distribution, as well as in limiting the effectiveness of this public 
support for farm income. 
With regard to the first hypothesis tested (H1. Land is not an effective 
parameter to enhance farm incomes via BPS), quantitative evidence high-
lights that land is an ineffective parameter to sustain farm incomes, since it 
is strongly concentrated and, above all, strongly correlated with pre-support 
farm income level. This finding confirms previous evidence about the negative 
effect of land in allowing effective and equal support to farm income. Moreo-
ver, it implies that the debate on internal convergence as a key mechanism for 
overcoming the distortion related to the historical references used to allocate 
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payments in some member states is not well posed until aid distribution is 
strongly affected by land distribution. These results also explain why the im-
pact of the application of specific redistributive tools (such as degressivity and 
capping) in Italy is limited.
Concerning the second hypothesis (H2. There are other parameters that 
can enhance farm incomes and reduce collateral effects currently at stake be-
cause direct payments are linked to land), the findings revealed that some al-
ternative parameters can strongly improve the effectiveness of direct payments 
aimed to enhance farm incomes in Italy. By comparing land (UAA) with oth-
er potential parameters referred to as economic (VA, VA/UAA, VA/WU) or 
structural characteristics (WU, WU/UAA), what emerges is that each param-
eter strongly influences the correlation of public support with farm income 
level and distribution according to farm income deciles. Moreover, quantita-
tive analyses clearly revealed that both work and value-added, when combined 
with land (WU/UAA, VA/UAA), allow more effective and equal allocations of 
the BPS. This result is because, thanks to these parameters, the BPS is weakly 
correlated with farm income level since it is mainly concentrated in the lowest 
deciles of farm income. Such an effect may allow a more equal and effective 
distribution of public support aimed at enhancing farm income.
6. Final remarks
The present paper gives interesting insights on the debate about the effec-
tiveness of the component of direct payments aimed at enhancing farm in-
comes. What clearly emerges is that the linkage between land and public aid 
strongly affects the correlation with farm income level and the allocation of 
public support in Italy. Further, the distribution of the BPS follows the distri-
bution of land, which is in turn positively correlated with farm income. As a 
result, the BPS has limited effectiveness since it is prevalently concentrated in 
the highest deciles of farm incomes. Therefore, this unequal distribution is a 
direct consequence of the use of land (UAA) as a parameter for the allocation 
of direct payments. However, quantitative evidence shows that these collateral 
effects could be quite overcome by adopting alternative parameters that take 
into account other economic and/or structural characteristics of farms. In It-
aly, for instance, a more effective use of the BPS would be possible, thanks to 
use of the work (WU) or the value-added (VA) parameters for allocation of 
public support. Both these parameters are also able to foster a more equal dis-
tribution of the BPS. However, the compliance with the disposals of the green 
box established by Uruguay round agreement on agriculture (URAA) must be 
properly ensured. In this regard, it must be noted that the introduction of al-
184 S. Ciliberti, A. Frascarelli
ternative criteria for the distribution of direct payments – in addition to/or in 
place of UAA – referred to income (proxied by VA), status as a producer or 
landowner, factor use (such as WU) or production level could be feasible pro-
vided that, according to Annexes 2 of the URAA, “factor use or production 
level are defined to a defined and fixed base period”. Such a solution would 
allow to maintain the decoupled support for farmers aimed to enhance their 
farm income in the green box, since it will continue to have minimal or no 
trade and production distortions at all.
All in all, this work provides interesting suggestions for policymakers, even 
though only circumscribed to the Italian case. Choice of land is pivotal within 
the debate on the effectiveness of public support of farm income. Indeed, the 
decision to allocate payments aimed at enhancing farm income on the basis 
of land distribution causes several distortions: from the capitalization effect to 
the concentration of public resources among farms with the highest level of 
farm incomes. 
With reference to the Italian case, quantitative evidence highlights that in-
troducing alternative parameters – such as work and value-added parameters – 
that substitute or combine the current one (land) could be more effective than 
continuing to focus attention on redistributive tools/mechanisms that can only 
reduce, but not eliminate, distortions caused by the linkage between land and 
direct payments. Such a decision is indeed strategic in order to increase the ef-
fectiveness and foster a more equal distribution of the BPS, a public support that 
aims to enhance farm income and accounts for half of the budget of Pillar I. 
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